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ABSTRACT
We show that if there exists a deterministic oracle that can determine the sum of the bits in the binary representation of x when presented with the RSA encryption of x, then there exists a probabilistic algorithm using this oracle to recover x when presented with the RSA encryption of x. We present a similar result for Rabin encryption. While an encryption function may be computationally infeasible to invert, it may be easy to extract valuable partial information from the encrypted data. This problem was first discussed by Micali and Goldwasser 1 . They devise an encryption system for which all non-trivial, easily computed predicates of the cleartext are secure under the assumption that determining quadratic residuosity modulo composite numbers is hard. However, since this result is not true for the RSA or Rabin encryption, it is important to determine what partial information is secure for these encryptions. Ben-Or, Chor, and Shamir 2 discuss the least significant bit predicate and show that it is as secure for both the RSA and Rabin encryptions as the encryptions themselves. In our paper we consider the sum of bits predicate and show that it is secure in the same sense.
Blum, Blum, and Shub 3 have designed a pseudo-random number generator using the least significant bit of a Rabin encryption. We believe that our result might be used to form the basis of a pseudo-random number generator which will be faster asymptotically than any current algorithm. The number of bits in the binary representation of the sum of the bits of x is lg lg x, but is only 1 for the least significant bit of x; thus one might be able to build faster pseudo-random number generators.
Our main result is the following theorem:
Theorem: If there exists a deterministic oracle, Sum Of Bits:
Input: The encryption EN(x) where xis chosen from ZN, and EN(x)
is either the RSA or Rabin encryption of x. Output: E( X), the sum of bits in the binary representation or X' then there exists a probabilistic algorithm A:
Furthermore, this algorithm runs in random polynomial time in the length of N.
In this paper we will present this algorithm and a proof of its correctness. Our paper makes use of the Ben-Or, Chor, Shamir result:
Let OL be a deterministic oracle that on input EN(x) can guess the least significant bit of x, such that for a random x in ZN the probability that OL will err is at most .!. -€ (for some fixed E > 0). Then there is a random polynomial-4 time algorithm, using OL , that breaks this {:a~~n} encryption.
The Algorithm
The following algorithm computes a function that is almost the least significant bit; we call it ALSB(x).
More formally, we compute
, a function such that ALSB(x)= least significant bit of x for > : + E of the domain, where E is a positive constant to be specified later.
Procedure ALSB Input: N, EN(x) where xis in ZN.
Output: ALSB(x).
Algorithm:
Correctness of the Algorithm
The intuition behind the correctness of the algorithm is that for even x, E( x )=E( x2-1 mod N), and therefore the algorithm is correct for these inputs. The hope is that for odd x the algorithm is correct frequently enough to guarantee the necessary probability overall. The remainder of this section is devoted to proving the following lemma. 
Combining these two facts we obtain the following: 
We will show that C( r ,k) ~ C( r+ 1,k ), which proves the claim. Since k is odd and r is even there is no carry out of the least significant bit when adding r and k. However, when adding r+ 1 and k there is a carry out of the least significant bit. In fact this carry propagates up to the least significant bit position such that r and k are 0 in that position. To the left of this position the carries are identical and to the right of this position there is a strictly greater number of carries when adding r+ 1 and k than when adding r and k.
Using the fact that 1rf.B.(k), we can conclude that fork
We do a case analysis on the form of the binary representation of k.
We first consider two very general cases; after this the remaining scattered cases will be dealt with in a ad hoc fashion. Our notation for describing these cases is borrowed from formal language theory.
Suppose that k=1{0,1} 1 10{0,1}m01 for some 1>1 and m>O. Consider the proof that b(k)<!. Since 1rt.B•(k), we pair off the numbers [2, 3] , [4, 5] 
